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Capital Flight and Exchange 'Restrictions 
Kazi Zahin S. Hasan 
Economics Honors Seminar 
Introduction: 
Many less-industrialized countries (LIC's) maintain exchange restrictions in order to ration 
foreign exchange. This is the only way to support an overvalued domestic currency without 
exhausting foreign exchange reserves . Such rationing allows authorities to restrict unwanted 
imports (generally speaking, any imports which compete with domestic industries), and also to 
monitor foreign investments. But some investment flows can be hidden from this monitoring 
system, just as the trade in smuggled goods is hidden. Foreign investments can be purchased with 
foreign currency acquired without the knowledge of domestic monetary authorities - for example, 
foreign currency purchased on a black market, or export receipts hidden by underinvoicing. In this 
paper, capital flows which are undeclared in their country of origin will be referred to as capital 
flight. As capitaI flight is not recorded, it is difficult to measure. Governments ofLIC's generally 
view capital flight as income accruing to residents which is secretly being spirited abroad in order 
to escape domestic taxes, and try to curtail it by imposing "capital controls" - exchange restrictions 
which hamper all outward capital flows. This paper will analyze the effects of some common 
capital controls on capital flight 
Previous studies of Capital Fli~ht; Alternative Definitions 
In this paper, capital flight is defined as the sum of all unrecorded capital outflows from a 
country which are f'manced by its private residents. However, past researchers have not agreed on 
the definition of this term; hence, it has been used very loosely. 
In one of the earliest articles on the subject, Bhagwati, Krueger and Wibulswadi (1974) use 
the term to refer to the undeclared capital outflows from several LIC's which are implied by the 
consistent underinvoicing of these countries' exports to the OEeD. Such capital outflows fit the 
definiton of capital flight used in this paper. This article established that the magnitude of capital 
flight was considerable. They found that in many of the countries they studied, hidden capital 




Cuddington (1986) defined capital flight as the sum of all outflows which finance the 
purchase of short-tenn foreign assets by private nonbank residents. He approximated capital flight 
by adding the errors and omissions in the balance of payments to certain short-tenn items from the 
capital account which he selected on a country-by-country basis. He then regressed the 
approximated capital flight series against macroeconomic indicators such as domestic inflation, the 
expected rate of depreciation of the domestic currency, and the difference between domestic and 
foreign interest rates. ~;,j.k~ 
Dooley (1988) was very similar to this paper in its modelling of capital flight, though he ~ ~ 
~ ~'- .. 7 
differed in his definition of the tenn. He defined capital flight as the stock of foreign assets whose fP· 
income was not repatriated to the country of residence of their owners. He approximated series of 
total stocks of external assets (using external debt, recorded capital flows and the errors and 
omissions in the balance of payments) and total stocks of income-earning external assets (using 
recorded investment income receipts and an approximate average return on foreign assets) 
belonging to residents of each country in his study. Series of capital flight were approximated by 
the difference between these two series. The following model was then estimated. 
Xi,t = Inflation in county i in year 1. 
FRi,t = Financial repression in country i in year t. 
RPi,t = Country-specific risk premium in country 1. 
Utw 
~ (r 0 ~ Equation 1 
The differences between this specification and the one used in this paper are discussed in detail 
later. 
Gulati (1987) calculated many series of capital flight based on different definitions, 
including those used by Cuddington (1986) and Dooley (1988). He expanded on the work of 
Bhagwati, Krueger and Wibulswadi (1974) to show how the underinvoicing of imports can 
reverse the direction of measu~ capital flight. The invoiced value of an import is the amount of 
foreign exchange that can be purchased through nonnal channels for the transaction. If imports are 
unde.rinvoiced, presumably to escape domestic tariffs, part of their price must be paid by giving up 
2 
existing foreign assets.1f the importing country does not allow its residents to purchase foreign 
assets - most LIe's do not - undeclared foreign assets will have to be sold. If high tariffs create a 
strong incentive to smuggle goods into the country, the net acquisitions of undeclared foreign 
assets can be negative in a given year. 
In most of the previous research, capital flight has been defined to include some declared 
capital outflows. Past researchers have wanted to test whether or not certain declared capital 
outflows from LIC's could be explained by bad domestic economic policies, and used the term 
capital flight to refer to whatever kinds of outflows they were concerned with. As one would 
expect, such research has found that declared capital flows are generally motivated by domestic 
policies which make foreign assets more attractive that domestic assets. This paper is specifically 
concerned with undeclared capital outflows, and defines capital flight to exclude all other capital 
flows. It is reasonable to refer to undeclared flows as "capital flight" as they are generally thought 
to be "fleeing" taxes in the country of origin. 
APproximati~f Capit~ Fli~ht: ". 
~capital ~t ;erie~for each country was approximated using Equation 2. As mentioned 
in GUI~' ), this may result in a negative number as smuggling may dominate capital flight in 
a given year. 
Equation 2 is de 'ved from a technique used in Dooley (1988) to approximate cumulated 
implicit capital outflowsl . 0 approximate the net flow of unrecorded assets in a given year, J ~ 
e}.... ---
subtract recorded capital inflows from recorded capital outflows. Using this equation is almost the 
same as using the errors and omissions from the balance of payments. Differences arise from the 
use of the World Bank's World Debt Tables to approximate external borrowing. Dooley 
approximated external borrowing by changes in the World Bank's estimate of Gross External Debt 
1 Since Dooley was interested in the stock of claims on foreigners, his technique approximated of cumulated implicit 
capital outflows. We have modified it to approximate total annual capital outflows. 
3 
because he found that balance of payments figures for external borrowing were consistently lower 
than the World Bank's estimates. This could be because the World Bank figures include estimates 
of private non-guaranteed debt from creditor source data. This kind of borrowing is more likely to 
be under-reported in balance of payments data. Also, the change in reserve assets were 
approximated by the change in reserves less gold. Though Dooley did not justify this technique, it 
can be justified on the grounds that gold has not been used ~uch in reserve transactions since 
1973. Any change in the value of gold reserves since then has been due primarily to the changing 
value of gold rather than to exchange transactions. 
/:1<$;,. re· f.[9('J (J'{ ;1Arecf 1;"'It~~r 
Definitions of Variables: 
CFi,t = Approximated capital flight from country i in year 1. 
From World Debt Tables: 
EDi,t = Gross external debt of country i at end of year t 
(govt. external debt + govt. guaranteed private external debt 
+ non-guaranteed private external debt + short-term debt). 
FromIFS: 
CAi.t = Current account deficit of country i in year 1. 
Ri,t = Total reserves, less gold, of the central bank of country i at the end of year t. 
ABi,t = Increase in reported exte~al assets of resident commercial banks (assets of banks) Of ) I~ 
country i in year t. . ,tiM ~1) '? 
ANi,t = Increase in reported ext~l!lal assets of non-bank private residents (assets of non-banks) J 
of country i in year t. 
DIi,t = Capital inflows to country i in year t due to direct foreign investment. 
The magnitudes of capital flight calculated using Equation 2 are quite considerable. It is 
evident from Figure 1 that such outflows are often comparable in magnitude to a country's export 
earnings. These outflows are facilitated with large ~~eign ~~q~ge inflows which residents hide 
from domestic authorities. If capital flight can be reduced, either by effective restrictions on 
4 
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undeclared capital outflows 
in particular, or by reducing 
the incentives for fmancial 
outflows in general, large 
inflows of foreign exchange 
which are currently hidden 
will become traded openly 
on exchage markets. This 
would greatly reducing the 
strain which persistent 







Figure 1: Capital Flight as a fraction of 
Exports f.o.b. 
---BRAZIL --c..[J_- INDIA -.-~ 
on many LICs' resirves of foreign exchange. This is why capital flight is important. . , 
ftJ NL J;rt. · A' CV'-" ~-
Specification of the CF EQuation: 
The specification used in this paper is shown in Equation 3. This specification was used 
because our purpose is to measure the effects of exchange restrictions on capital flight after 
controlling for macroeconomic policies which should affect capital flows. 
Equation 3 
c:.i,t = ~o + ~lFRi,t + ~2ni.t + ~3(ni,t - n:) + ~4RATEi,t + ~5PURCHi,t + ~6PUR&REMi,t + ei,t 
1,t 
The variables in this specification are discussed below. 
Capital Flight Variable (CFj,tLXi,t1. Each CFi,t value calculated using Equation 2 is "scaled" 
by dividing it by Exports f.o.b. of country i in year t. This technique is used because we can be 
fairly sure that the scale of capital flight from a large country like Brazil will be larger than from a 
smaller country like Sri Lanka; unless we account for this, our regression will suffer from serious 
heteroscedasticity. As foreign exchange is required for capital flight, export earning seems like a 
better variable with which to "scale" capital flight than GDP or GNP. 
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Tax Rate Variable (Qj,t)~ Suppose that the government of country i taxes its residents' declared 
investment income at an average rate of Qi,t in year t. Residents' declared investment income 
includes declared income to residents from all declared domestic and foreign assets. It excludes 
only income from foreign assets acquired via undeclared capital outflows (income from 
investments made with flight capital). 
Assumption 1: We have assumed that residents of X do not pay taxes to foreign 
governments on any of their investments in those countries, and that their ability to under-
declare income from declared assets (whether foreign or domestic) is limited. 
We do not have information about taxes rates on investment income in different countries. 
However, we can approximate Qi,t from the equation: 
Q . = Ti,t 
l,t y . 
l,t 
Equation 4 
Ti,t = (Government Revenue - Grants - Receipts from Social Security) of country i in 
year t. 
Yi,t = GNP of country i in year t. 
Dooley does not attempt to explicitly estimate the effects of taxes. He constructs a country-specific 
risk premium (RPi,n), a premium on the country's external debt, which he interprets as "measuring 
nonresidents' perception of being 'taxed' by the subject country's government. 
We expect that the coefficient of the tax rate variable will be positive. As tax rates are 
increase, ceteris paribus, residents of country i are likely to make more undeclared foreign 
investments in order to escape domestic taxes on investment income. 
Inflation Variable (1ti,t:1!~ The difference between 1ti,t, and 1tt (the domestic and foreign 
inflation rates) in year t is also relevant as inflation can be considered a tax on the value of 
unindexed domestic assets which is administered by printing money. 
1ti,t = Inflation rate in country i in year t 
6 
1tt = Weighted average of inflation rates across OECD countries in year t. Using this series 
to approximate a "foreign inflation rate" amounts to assuming that residents of 
country i consider only inflation rates in OECD countries when deciding whether to 
invest abroad. 
We expect that the coefficient of the inflation variable to be positive also. 
Expected Returns and Financial Repression (FRi,V';' We can also estimate a measure ofjinancial 
repression in country i in year t. In Dooley (1988), financial repression measures "the difference 
between interest rates paid on short-term assets denominated in U.S. dollars and time deposits 
denominated in the subject country's domestic currency and adjusted for actual exchange rates." 
Since I am assuming that all capital flight is not short-term, that it is likely to be attracted to 
countries other than just the U.S, and that private residents cannot perfectly predict future 
variations in exchange rates, I will defme it slightly differently. 
Let us estimate expected dollar returns of assets purchased with flight capital relative to 
declared assets. Suppose that in year t, a resident of country i makes an undeclared investment of 
$1 in an dollar-denominated asset abroad, paying interest at a rate rt. Because the investment is 
undeclared, it does not incur taxes in the investor's country of residence. We also assume that the 
investor pays no taxes in the foreign country. So the expected dollar value of the asset in year t+ 1 
is the expected return ERt * . 
EquationS 
rt = LIBOR rate on one-year US$ deposits in year t. The annualized six-month rate was 
chosen because I have not made any assumptions about the term-structure of assets 
purchased with capital flight outflows. One year seemed like a reasonable 
"medium" term, but it was not available for all the years in the study. The six-
month rate appeared to be the best alternative. However, some combination of 
longer and shorter-term rates may have been better. Assuming arbitrage between 
7 
interest rates on dollar-denominated accounts, rt should be a good proxy for a 
foreign interest rate on dollar-denominated assets. 
Now suppose that in the beginning of year t, one invests $1 in a local-currency 
denominated asset in country i. Its expected dollar value at the beginning of year n+ 1 is the 
expected return ERi,t. 
Equation 6 
Si,t = Exchange rate (price of dollars in domestic currency) of country i in year t. 
ri,t = Average interest rate on savings in country i in year t. 
The discount rate was used as it is the only interest rate which is consistently 
reported across the countries in my study. 
The fmancial repression of country i in year t relative to the OEeD is defined by the equation: 
FR = ER; = (1 + r:) E[Si,t+l] Equation 7 
',I ERi,1 (l + ri,I)(1- Oi,l) Si,l 
Assumption 2: Assume that the currency is expected to depreciate at a rate consistent with 
absolute purchasing-power parity. 
Absolute purchasing power parity: Si,IP: = Pi,l 
=> InSi,1 = InPi,1 -lnP: 
1 dS. 1 dP. 1 dP* => __ 1 = __1 __ _ 
Sit dt Pil dt P: dt 
, I 'I t 
~S· ~. ~* • => _'_,I = _,_,I _ __ I = 1t. - 1t 
S P * "I I i,l i,l PI 
If this is the expected rate of depreciation, then 
!l 
E[ Si,l+l] = Si,l + ~Si,t = Si,l (1 + 1t~ - 1t:) 
E[S.] c.. C/ 1,1+1 = (1 + . -J!' .) => 1t, tT 1t t 
Si,t ' -
If we substitute Equation 9 in Equation 7, FRi,t becomes: 
(1 + r: )(1 + 1ti t - 1t:) FR = ' 





Other forms of assumption 2 are possible. For example, we could have assumed that the 
expected depreciation is determined by relative, rather than absolute, purchasing power 
parity. 
Though observed exchange rates and prices do not reflect absolute purchasing power parity 
from year to year, it is still a good indicator of long-term trends in exchange rates. Therefore it 
should be a good indicator of residents' expectations of movements in the domesic currency. 
We expect the coefficient of financial repression to be positive. As foreign assets become 
more attractive, relative to domestic assets, we expect residents of country i to facilitate more 
capital flight in order to purchase more of them. If it is allowed at all, declared foreign investment 
should also increase. 
Capital Controls: 
Using the IMF's Annual Reports on Exchallf~e Arrangements and Restrictions, I 
constructed 3 series of dummy variables for each country. 
RATEi,t = 0 if country i maintained a "clean" floating exchange rate in year t, 1 if the rate was 
determined by a "dirty" or managed float, or if it was fixed. 
REMITi,t = 0 if remittances of current profits from direct foreign investments to nonresident 
investors were not restricted by country i in year t, and 1 otherwise. 
PURCHi,t = 0 if the purchase of foreign assets by residents of country i was not restricted in year 
t, and 1 otherwise. 
I found on examining the series REMITi,t and PURCHi,t that PURCHi,t is always 1 if REMITi,t is 
1, though the converse is not true. This implies that remittance restrictions are only imposed in 
conjunction with purchase restrictions. This additional information can be captured if remittance 
restrictions are described by the dummy variable PUR&REMi,t. 
PUR&REMi,t = 1 if (REMITi,t = 1 and PURCHi,t =1), and 0 otherwise. 
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Purchase Restriction Dummy (PURCHi,tt This is the most common restriction on declared capital 
outflows. Consider a hypothetical pair of countries j and k, which are identical in year t except that 
PURCHj,t=O and PURCHk,t= 1. 
Residents of j and k should have the same exogenous demand for foreign assets. However, 
purchase restrictions limit declared capital outflows from k. To compensate for this, its residents 
will substitute undeclared assets for declared assets, and demand more transactions in unauthorized 
foreign exchange in order to facilitate more capital flight. Unauthorized foreign exchange is foreign 
exchange which can be bought and sold without the knowledge of domestic authorities. Notes 
traded in a black market and foreign bank accounts hidden by misinvoicing trade both constitute 
unauthorized foreign exchange. Capital outflows must be facilitated with unauthorized foreign 
exchange if they are to be undeclared. Thus, k's demand curve for unauthorizedforeign exchange 
(see figure 2) will be higher thanj's, and the quantity of capital flight from k will tend to exceed the 
quantity of capital flight from j, though at a higher price. This effect would lead us to expect a 
positive coefficient for the purchase restriction dummy. 
However, authorities who disapprove of declared capital outflows are likely to disapprove 
even more strongly of hidden capital outflows, and may take steps to decrease the supply of 
unauthorized foreign exchange. They may enforce stiff penalties for black market transactions in 
foreign exchange, or for fraudulent invoicing. If these measures are effective, they will deter 
unauthorized transactions in foreign exchange, causing k's supply curve/or unauthorized/oreign 
exchange (see figure 2) to be higher than j's. The higher the supp~:~~~ ? 
unauthorized foreign exchange. This might be measured by _ l5lack market premium on ddIlars; '" 
as it rises, so will the cost of capital flight. If k's purchase restric i are-aeeeffiflafl-iea-by'-"d~ 
restrictions on unauthorized foreign exchange transactions, k's supply curve may be much higher 
thanj's, and the quantity of capital flight from k will tend to be lower than the quantity of capital 




coefficient of PURCHi,t should 
give us some idea which of 
these two effects is dominant. 
Remittance Restriction Dummy 
(PUR&REMj,tl;. An examination 
of the variables PURCHi,t and 
REMITi,t revealed that countries 
which restrict declared capital 
outflows may also restrict 
remittances of current profits 
from direct foreign investments 
to foreign investors. 
Remittances of profits may be 
restricted if governments fear 
that such remittances are being 
made in excess of profits 
currently accruing to foreign 
investors, and are being used to 
repatriate foreign capital. Thus, 
Figure 2: Effects of Purchase or 
Remittance Restrictions on Capital Flight. 
Price 
Qk* Qj Qk 
Dj is the demand curve in country j. 




Quantity of Unauthorized 
Foreign Exchange 
Qj is the quantity of capital flight from country j. 
Dk is the demand curve in country k. As undeclared foreign assets are 
substitutes for declared foreign assets, Dk will be higher than Dj. 
Sk is the supply curve in country k if the restrictions on unauthorized 
foreign exchange transactions which accompany restrictions on 
declared outflows are not effective. As Sk is not much higher than Sj, 
the quantity of capital flight Qk from k is larger than Qj. 
Sk* is the supply curve in country k if the restrictions on unauthorized 
exchange transactions which accompany restrictions on declared 
outflows are effective. As Sk* is much higher than Sj, the quantity of 
capital flight Qk* from k is smaller than Qj. 
many countries restrict profit remittances to some percentage of the value of the foreign investment. 
Consider two countries j and k, which are identical in year t except that PUR&REMj,t=O and 
PUR&REMk,t=l. 
If remittances of profits are restricted, disinvestment must take place through capital flight, 
causing k's demand curve for unauthorized foreign exchange to be higher than j's. But as before, 
this additional restriction on financial flows might be accompanied by stricter measures to suppress 
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unauthorized transactions in foreign exchange, so that k's supply curve of unauthorized foreign 
exchange may be much higher than j's. Again, the sign of the regression coefficient of the 
remittance restriction dummy should give us some idea which of these two effects dominates. 
/ LJ) ),kJ " .,.,It .. {~ ~ 
Exchan~ Rate Dummy eRA TEj,t1 A coun, with an current account deficit and a fixed exchange 
rate is probably rationing foreign exchang1 In such a country, autd ities are likely to disapprove 
of capital flight whether or not they impose restrictions on declarJcaPital movements (which 
would be detected by the purchase and remittance restriction d mies). So if two countries are 
identical in a given year except that one has a floating exchange te and the other does not, capital 
flight from the latter will probably be more costly than from t e former. As most of the countries in 
our studies have persistent current account deficits, we woul expect the coefficient of the 
exchange rate dummy to be negative. . (Ih 
Jg J) ~ foe A, ?"1 ".f rJ ~." 1 
Relm'ssion Results and Comments: 
Data for the years 1971-1990 inclusive was pooled across the following 20 countries: 
Brazil, Cameroon, Chile, Colombia, Egypt, Greece, Honduras, India, Korea, Mauritius, 
Morocco, Pa...1dsta...n. Philippines, Portug:l l , Sri Lanka, Thailand, Turkey, Uruguay, Yugoslavia, 
and Zimbabwe. The panel was not symmetrical as all the series I needed were not reported by all 
20 countries every year. There was a total of 307 observations. Sample statistics for the variables 
are presented in Table 1 below. 
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Table 1: Sam Ie Statistics 
MEAN STDDEV MINIMUM MAXllvlUM 
RAlE 0.91857 0.27395 0.00000 1.00000 
PURCR 0.88274 0.32226 0.00000 1.00000 
~/ PUR&REM 0.36808 0.48307 0.00000 1.00 ···i- r'O';C' · 
n 0.19786 0.088488 0.042672 .9490 
FR 1.24905 0.21587 0.18307 2.23823 
CFIX 0.16358 0.37955 -1.13255 2.49939 
7t-7t * 0.21812 1.11211 -0.20424 12.76235 
From Table 1 it is obvious that capital flight is negative in some observations, as predicted by 
Gulati (1987). 
Equation 3 on page 5 was first estimated using OLS (regression OLS 1). An F-test shows 
that the regression OLSI is significant even at a=O.OI, though the only slope coefficients which 
would normally be considered significant are those of the purchase restriction dummy, the 
remittance dummy and the inflation term. It is surprising that one of the significant coefficients -
that of the inflation term - has the wrong sign. This suggests that our model is seriously mis-
specified. 
The estimation model in OLSI assumes implicitly that the intercept term and slope 
coefficients are the same across all the years and countries in the sample. Equation 11 was 
estimated using OLS (regression OLS2) so that this assumption could be put to the test. 




+~6PUR&REMi,t + L'YiCOUNTRYi + I8tYEARt + ei,1 
i=2 1=2 
8t = 1 if an observation corresponds to year t (t:;t1971), 0 otherwise. 
'Yi = 1 if an observation corresponds to country i (i=1 represents Brazil), 0 otherwise. 
The OLS2 estimates of slope coefficients which also appear in Equation 3 are presented in 
Table 2. The complete results of regression OLS2 are provided in Appendix 2. An F-test 
comparing OLS 1 and OLS2 shows that the null hypothesis that the '¥i's and the 8t's are all zeros 
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can be rejected at a significance level of a=O.D1. This implies that the simple model used in . 
estimation OLS 1 is too restrictive. So Equation 3 was estimated a third time using a fixed-effects '] W ~ 
model which allows the intercept terms to vary across the different countries in the study, though ~ 
not across time (regression FEl). A fourth estimation involved performing an OLS regression on 
the means across time of each series for each country (regression BETWEENl). 
T bl 2 R a e egresslOn R ul es ts 
OLSI OLS2 FEl BE1WEENl 
Estimated Estimated Estimated Estimated 
Variable Coefficient t-statistic Coefficient t-statistic Coefficient t-statistic Coefficient t-statistic 
C -.05 -.3286 -0.2 -0.5385 
(.15) (0.34) 
RATE -.086 -1.0541 0.2 0.3847 0.2 1.2798 -0.2 -1.2211 
(.082) (0.16) (0.17) (0.18 
PURCH .14 1.9892 -0.1 -0.6303 0.07 0.4041 0.07 0.4605 
(.07) (0.17) (0.18) 
1.8137 J (0.16) PUR&REM .084 1.7774 0.40 2.63 0.30 0.09 1.0531 
(.047) (.152) (0.16) (0.09) 
n .3 0.9245 0.4 0.7178 0.3 0.4051 -0.3 -0.3250 
(.34) (0.52) (0.57) (0.87) 
FR .06 .4852 -0.2 -1.3291 -0.2 -0.9101 0.4 0.9433 
(.14) (0.15) (0.16) (0.43) 
'" -.042 -1.7197 -0.02 -0.9251 -0.05 -1.6134 -0.01 -0.1872 7t-7t 
(.025) (0.028) (0.03) (0.07) 
AdjustedR2 0.029 t'L -0.039 -0.12 f..-
F-statistic 2.55 
fA- t ? ) V~-:M ~ ~ DW statistic 1.55 . . ,.. 
In the BETWEENI estimation, none of the variables was significant. This implies that 
most of the variation e~ed by the model takes place over time, and that differences between 
countries are not explained very well. This is not surprising as there are only 20 countries, and 
lJ~? 
hence only 20 observations available for the BETWEENI estimation. With only 12 degrees of ~ 
freedom, we should not have expected this regression to ~o very weI ~ ? ~7 ~'r -~! 
The slope coefficients differ widely between the@ , OLSI a d OLS2 stimations. The 
coefficients of almost all the variables change sign across the three regressions, showing that the 
model is not very robust. Such variation in the sign of the financial repression coefficient is not 
surprising, as this coefficient was already known to be extremely sensitive to specification. In an 
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earlier run of the OLS 1 procedure in which expected exchange rates had been modelled 
differently2, its sign was also been negative. 
All of this points to the conclusion that the predictive power of our model is very weak:, a 
conclusion supported by extremely low adjusted R2 statistics. 
The slope coefficients of the remittance restriction dummy is the only one which has the 
same sign and is significnt in all three estimations. The coefficient of the inflation tenn is 
surprisingly negative in all four regressions, but is not significant in OLS2, suggestingtli:atliwa~. 
acting as a proxy"f~~ years' '\ which shocks which generally caused high inflation. al~O reduced 
/ \ 
, capital flight considerably. \ "''---_~ 
.. ~) ---.--- -" -~-
Conclusions: 
Because of the weakness of our regression results, the only specific conclusion we can 
reach is that the coefficient of the remittance restriction variable is positive. This implies that a 
country which restricts both residents' purchases of foreign assets and profit remittances to 
nonresidents should reduce its undeclared capital outflows if it removes its remittance restrictions, 
all other factors remaining constant. The coefficient of the tax rate variable is consistently positive, 
though not significant; so we may hypothesize that capital flight might also be reduced by lowering 
tax rates on investment income accruing to residents (ceteris paribus, again), though this 
hypothesis is harder to support empirically. 
I 
The reason that our imperical fmdings are so weak: is probably does not lie in our o 
approximation of capital flight. Our approximation just adds the difference between the Balance of 
Payments' and the World Bank's estimates of external borrowing to the Errors and Omissions in 
~ ~------------------the BOP. We can be sure that the errors and emissions term is largely made up of errors. If these 
~dom, they will introduce a introducing a high level of noise into our approximation. This 
2 In that run, we had postulated that the expected rate of depreciation in yeat t was equal to the observed rate of 
depreciation in year t-1. 
15 
should not bias coefficient estimates, but there is another factor which probably has. Large 
negative values in our approximated series of capital flight point to the possibility that there is a 
great deal of negative capital flight due to smuggling, but our model is purely financial and does 
not account for incentives to smuggle goods into the countries studied. In this we may have serious 
mis-specification, which could seriously bias our estimates. 
16 
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Appendix 1 : Years and Countries Sampled 
The variables CFi,tfXi,t. FRi,t, ,Qi,t, and (1ti,t-1tt) could not all be constructed for each of 
the twenty years between between 1971 to 1990 inclusive as one or more of the necessary 
macroeconomic series were sometimes not reported in a given year. The table below lists which 
years were finally included in the sample for each country. 
COUNTRY YEARS SAMPLED (INCLUSIVE) 
BRAZIL 1971-1989 
CAMEROON 1975-1984, 1986-1988 
CHILE 1980-1988 
COWMBIA 1971-1989 










SRI LANKA 1971-1990 
TIIAILAND 1976-1990 





Appendix 2: Complete OLS2 Regression Results 
The dummies COUNTRYi (i=2,3 ... 20) correspond to the sampled countries excluding 
Brazil, in alphabetically ascending order (as listed in Appendix 1). 
The dummies YEARt (t=2,3 ... 20) correspond to the years from 1972 to 1990 inclusive. 
YEARt corresponds to the year 1970+t. 
Method of estimation = Ordinary Least Squares 
Dependent variable: SCALEDCF 
Current sample: 1 to 307 
Number of observations: 307 
Mean of dependent variable = .163579 
Std. dev. of dependent var. = .379547 
Sum of squared residuals = 25.5889 
Variance of residuals = .097668 
Std. error of regression = .312518 



















YEAR 11 .054703 
YEAR 12 .121077 
YEAR 13 -.174286 
YEAR 14 -.127471 
YEAR15 .197488 
YEAR 16 .096985 
YEAR 17 .130637 
YEAR18 -.216234 




































Adjusted R-squared = .322016 
Durbin-Watson statistic = 1.81257 
F-statistic (zero slopes) = 4.30314 
Schwarz Bayes. Info. Crit. = -1.64525 
































COUNTRY5 .264062 .144377 1.82898 ~ 
COUNTRY6 -.032678 .214927 -.152041 
COUNTRY7 -.313977 .136019 -2.30834 ¢::-
COUNTRY8 -.158135 .124220 -1.27302 
COUNTRY9 .218906 .162923 1.34362 
COUNTRY 10 -.080803 .185032 -.436696 
COUNTRY 11 .268526 .161841 1.65920 
COUNTRY 12 .115307 .174516 .660725 
COUNTRY 13 .467512 .223981 2.08728 ~ 
COUNTRY 14 -.168776 .118693 -1.42196 
COUNTRY 15 .082285 .164877 .499070 
COUNTRY16 .173812 .179553 .968027 
COUNTRY 17 .415127 .164636 2.52149 ~ 
COUNTRY 18 .218462 .240614 .907934 
COUNTRY 19 -.222861 .171784 -1.29733 
COUNTRY20 -.399346 .131814 -3.02961 ~ 
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